

**Witness Statement of:** Bonnie Lynn Rind  
**No. of Statement:** 1  
**Exhibits:** 6  
**Date of Statement:** 11 January 2011

**IN THE CORONER'S COURT**

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**WITNESS STATEMENT OF BONNIE LYNN RIND**

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I, Bonnie Lynn Rind **WILL SAY**, as follows:-

1. I make this witness statement to assist the Coroner at the Inquest relating to the One-Two-Go OG269 air crash on 16 September 2007.

**Background and reason for my involvement**

2. I have conducted significant research and investigation into the One-Two-Go OG269 air crash. I outline the reason for my involvement below.
3. My brother, Stefan Woronoff, was killed in the crash of 16 September 2007.
4. I have over 40 hours of private pilot training and many more hours sharing the cockpit with private pilots. My background in engineering and familiarity with flight and flight accident causes, including a respect for the differences between private flight and commercial flight, were useful assets while researching the causes of the crash, and the conduct of One-Two-Go Airlines, Orient Thai Airlines and the Thai Department of Civil Aviation (DCAT) during the subsequent crash investigation.
5. In September of 2007 immediately subsequent to the crash, DCAT stated that the cause would be determined within two weeks – much too brief a time period for a thorough

investigation into the causes of a commercial airline crash. DCAT shortly thereafter suggested the cause of the crash was wind sheer, but claimed that wind sheer might not be the only factor. (Final reports state that wind sheer was not a factor in the crash.)

6. In November 2007, I stumbled upon an Australian channel 9 news program about the crash of OG269. The program included One-Two-Go pilot testimony of illegal and dangerous flight by the airline on a regular basis, including but not limited to pilots working hours in excess of Thai and international law. The reporters obtained One-Two-Go's daily pilot route scheduling documents for the months of August and September 2007. These documents show that OG269's Captain Arief and Co-pilot Montri had both worked hours vastly in excess of the legal limits. The program shows a senior DCAT official (and member of the crash investigation team) reviewing these documents. This DCAT official appeared shocked by these daily rosters and stated that he had received fraudulent roster summaries from Orient Thai. A link to this portion of the program can be seen at:

[http://investigateudom.smugmug.com/gallery/5737966\\_hXppV#354372047\\_KLMxn-A-LB](http://investigateudom.smugmug.com/gallery/5737966_hXppV#354372047_KLMxn-A-LB).

7. In the Australian channel 9 program, One-Two-Go/Orient Thai CEO Udom Tantiprasongchai denies any excessive flight hours by his pilots. A link to this portion of the program can be seen at: [http://investigateudom.smugmug.com/Zoos/Australian-Sunday-9-Video/5737966\\_hXppV#354372012\\_esyyu](http://investigateudom.smugmug.com/Zoos/Australian-Sunday-9-Video/5737966_hXppV#354372012_esyyu).

8. The entire Australian channel 9 program can be downloaded at: [http://investigateudom.com/files/OTG\\_expose.mp4](http://investigateudom.com/files/OTG_expose.mp4). It should be run on the computer via QuickTime or any other mp4 player.

9. Also in November 2007, I learned of an internet professional pilots' forum and other forums discussing events in Thailand containing postings from pilots working at One-Two-Go/Orient Thai. The shock, horror and anger felt by the pilots over this crash are evident in

their postings. Their descriptions of the airline painted an ugly picture of the airline and its management.

10. In early February 2008, a senior DCAT official made a press statement claiming that DCAT had taken over the crash investigation from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the U.S. body responsible for air crash investigations in the United States and of U.S. aircraft abroad. The statement claimed NTSB was “unable to find the causes of the crash”. This same DCAT statement said “No punishment will be imposed on any agency or personnel after completion of the investigation because the accident was beyond control”.
11. This press statement was the first I had heard of involvement by NTSB. I immediately telephoned the NTSB lead investigator for the crash, Jill Andrews (now Jill Demko). She said she was aware of the press report but assured me that NTSB was continuing their investigation into the crash and had been asked by the Thai government to “ghost write” the crash report for DCAT. She said she could not share information regarding the crash with me.
12. I asked Ms. Andrews if she was aware that the pilot work hours she had received from One-Two-Go/Orient Thai were fraudulent. She stated that she was not aware of this. By this time in February 2008, DCAT had held the true pilot work schedule documents for approximately four months.
13. I emailed Ms. Andrews the link to the Australian program initially. (Eventually, I was able to send her the same One-Two-Go/Orient Thai daily rosters the program had shown, the true flight schedule summaries compiled by One-Two-Go and the fraudulent flight schedule summaries provided by One-Two-Go to flight investigators. These can be found at exhibit 1.
14. At this point, I became concerned that DCAT did not have the will to ensure a proper investigation into the crash of OG269, so I started a respectful online petition requesting “an

independent and transparent investigation by authorities”. The petition referenced some of the online commercial pilot postings and the Australian program. The petition can be found at <http://investigateudom.com/plea.php>.

15. The petition quickly gained momentum among the victims’ families and friends. To my surprise, it also quickly gained the notice of people working for One-Two-Go and Orient Thai Airlines. Pilots, flight attendants, office personnel and others from One-Two-Go/Orient Thai, current and past employees, reached out to me via the petition.
16. Over time, I was able to communicate indirectly with a representative from ICAO and directly with personnel at Boeing (the owner of McDonnell Douglas) as well as the numerous current and former employees of One-Two-Go/Orient Thai.
17. As I learned of repeated frauds, cover-up attempts and report delays, I began to believe that a crash investigation consistent with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 13, “International Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation” was unlikely without more support, and the petition evolved into an active investigation. I fully agree with Annex 13’s statement that the objective of a crash investigation is the prevention of future accidents and I feared an accurate crash report on One-Two-Go OG269 would never be completed, and if completed, would never be made public.
18. A note about my methods: When I received document or testimony of fact regarding One-Two-Go/Orient Thai, I carefully worked to independently verify the information and also worked with commercial pilots working in that part of Asia to ensure I properly understood and communicated the meaning of the information, Then, whenever possible after considering the safety of my source, I posted the material on the internet. I am proud of the standards of my portion of the investigation and pleased to have contributed important material toward ensuring an accurate and more complete investigation into the crash of

OG269, and into ensuring a significant portion of the investigation findings were made public.

### **Management of One Two Go**

19. It is my belief that One-Two-Go, and its parent company, Orient Thai, are corrupt and mismanaged, and have daily operated with reckless disregard for passenger safety.
20. As acknowledged in the NTSB crash report which can be found at exhibit 2 and confirmed in the DCAT version at exhibit 3, One-Two-Go/Orient Thai was shown to have approved non-existent pilot check rides for four of the pilots in the months after the crash, therefore making the airlines unsafe even after a horrific crash resulting in the deaths of 90 people. (The fraudulent check ride documents were compiled by ICAO and provided to DCAT months before I provided them to NTSB.)
21. As acknowledged in the NTSB crash report and confirmed in the DCAT version, the company was shown to be scheduling pilot working hours vastly in excess of legal working hours. These work hours directly contributed to the crash of OG269 yet that did not deter the airline from continuing to schedule pilots to fly in excess of the law in the months after the crash, as shown by the work hours/days in the monthly pilot route schedule referenced above. (Note: Apparently no one within DCAT or One-Two-Go/Orient Thai tracks actual pilot work hours which should involve documenting the hours a pilot *has* worked which would include additional real world events that affect a pilot's work hours such as flight delays, so these known excessive work hours are based on best case scenarios.)
22. DCAT eventually censored both One-Two-Go and Orient Thai Airlines for their failure to have a safety program and for their excessive pilot work hours, and temporarily grounded One-Two-Go. A translation of the reprimand can be found at exhibit 4. (This censor of One-Two-Go/Orient Thai occurred only after I posted online the ICAO details of fraudulent check rides and One-Two-Go scheduling documents showing excessive flight hours.)

23. The company executives were shown to plan and execute a fraud to hide their culpability by creating and distributing to crash investigators fraudulent work summaries for pilots Arief and Montri. (And DCAT was shown to take no action when this fraud was uncovered.) That email and the attached spreadsheets are at exhibit 5. (This email was provided by a former employee of One-Two-Go/Orient Thai who obtained the email from a company computer. I cannot disclose this person's name as the individual resides in Thailand and is fearful of repercussions).

24. Indirectly related to the crash of OG269, I received documentation, letters and photographs from One-Two-Go/Orient Thai pilots who had tried in vain to stop the dangerous and illegal practices of the company in the years prior to the crash of OG269. These included:

- Details and images of logbooks and maintenance records showing maintenance fraud and flight with unfit aircraft.
- Details of illegal flight over water.
- A letter written by a company pilot warning One-Two-Go/Orient Thai management of the dangers of their mismanagement.
- A letter written by a company pilot to ICAO and civil aviation bodies warning of the dangers of One-Two-Go/Orient Thai airlines.

These documents can be downloaded at <http://investigateudom.com/timeline.php>.

## **Fire and Rescue**

25. I researched ICAO standards for Fire and Rescue, in particular, sections 9.2.5, 9.2.33 and 2.11.3 of the 'Aerodrome Standards' after hearing from family members and people living in Phuket of concerns regarding the quality of the rescue. According to these ICAO standards, for Phuket International Airport to accept One-Two-Go's MD-82s for landing, the airport is required to meet or exceed 'Category 7' for fire and rescue protection which can be found at exhibit 6, which according to ICAO 9.2.33 includes a minimum of 2 fire trucks. However, on the day of the accident, at least, there were insufficient rescue personnel and materials on site to meet category 7 standards per those sections.
26. According to press reports, the foam and water for the fire trucks had been used three days prior in a training exercise and not been restocked. The Thai crash report provides impressive numbers on the capacity of the initial fire trucks at the scene – capacity, not contents – and almost immediately below in this report is a mechanic's testimony that only a single truck was spraying water while the other two stood by.
27. According to ICAO Fire and Rescue standards, if an airfield is unable to meet their category standards for fire and rescue for any period of time, it is the responsibility of air traffic control to notify incoming flights of the reduced level of protection available. A review of the transcript of communications between the tower and the aircraft provided in the DCAT crash report show that the crew were not notified of this downgrade.
28. According to both crash reports, the first responders also took approximately 5 minutes to be on-scene. Again, this is a breach of ICAO standards 9.2 which details the requirements for the availability of equipment and accident response times not to exceed 3 minutes, with only 1 minute for support of additional extinguishing application.
29. According to an American citizen, Jeff Craig, who was a paramedic with the fire and rescue crew in the town of Phuket at the time of the accident and who aided in the rescue on that day, the local Phuket town fire station received a message from Phuket International Airport

stating that an aircraft had “slid” off the runway and that assistance from town was needed. No emergency was declared and no emergency protocols were followed. Mr. Craig says the fire fighters in town believed they would be pushing an aircraft back onto the runway. (Note: Mr. Craig is willing to make a statement to this court.)

30. Due to the failure to make clear the situation was an emergency, town rescue services travelled without haste to the crash site, taking quite a bit of time – in the range of 20-40 minutes – to arrive. This slow arrival of support to the fiery aircraft continued the breach of ICAO requirements.
31. Based on my understanding of the cause of death of some of the passengers, the inadequate materials and delays to rescue may have had a negative impact on passengers who initially survived the crash.

## **Runway**

32. After reading the crash reports, it became apparent that a significant discrepancy regarding the width of runway 27 at Phuket International Airport exists. NTSB measured the runway to be 45 meters wide free of obstructions while DCAT claims that the runway is 75 meters wide free of obstructions, in both cases less than the 150 meters specified for international standards. This is illustrated at appendix 22 and 23 of the DCAT crash report and is attached at exhibit 3.
33. The Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) of Thailand, relied upon by pilots for accurate topographical and other information of the airport, identifies the embankment at 75 meters.
34. It is therefore possible that the recorded location of the embankment does not match the actual location of the embankment along the runway. (Google Earth provides highly

accurate topographical information. It too locates the embankment at less than 50 meters from the runway 27.)

- 35. Based on the cause of death for some of the passengers, I believe any discrepancy in the true location of the embankment may have had a negative impact the number of crash survivors.
  
- 36. According to the DCAT crash report, Thai Authorities do not plan to amend The Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) of Thailand, potentially exposing current and future travellers to Phuket International Airport to unnecessary risk.

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed.....  
Bonnie Lynn Rind

Dated.....