

The Last Moments of OG 269 – Confirmed Information From The “Black Box”

From DCVR and DFDR

Flying pilot is First Officer Montri

Montri: “autopilot off”

Montri: “autothrottle on”

Someone confirmed ATC report of wind shear and heavy rain

Montri: “100”

Montri: “40”

“Sink Rate”

The aircraft descended below 50 ft

The aircraft rose above 50 ft

Montri announces a go around

(The throttle is already in retard mode)

(The TOGA is not engaged)

Engine EPR decreased

Montri: “flaps 15”

Landing gear selected up

Montri: “You have control”

(no acknowledgement from Arief and no further communication from either pilot)

Engine thrust idle for 15 seconds

4 seconds before impact thrust was increased to close to takeoff thrust.

Wind shear detected 1-2 seconds before impact

Wind shear warble noted just prior to loss of CVR (impact)

Comments from Investigators:

1) Pilots said very little

2) Winds were provided several times during the approach. The last time, 4 minutes before the crash was winds 240Magnetic, 40-Knots.

Cause of the Crash:

Flight crew error

Bonnie’s Synopsis:

- 1) The inexperienced First Officer, Montri is the flying pilot. The 17-knot crosswind component for Runway 27 (265 Magnetic) and rain conditions would warrant a careful assessment before deciding to land. (Orient Thai permits landing an aggressive 30-knot crosswind in wet conditions, where as American Airlines, for example, permits only a 20-knot wet maximum crosswind landing.)
- 2) Upon deciding to attempt the landing after the reported wind shear and heavy rain, Arief, the vastly more

experienced pilot, should have been far more engaged in the landing, if not the flying pilot.

- 3) By the time of the "Sink Rate" warning, there had been 3 strong indications of wind shear - Reduced thrust (EPR setting), higher than normal indicated airspeed (indicated by the reduced throttles) and fluctuation in vertical speed. Therefore, a go around should certainly have been initiated by this time. However, the attempted landing continues.
- 4) Upon finally declaring a go around, Montri should have pushed the throttles forward at the same time as he pushed the TOGA button. The TOGA was never engaged, and the **engine remained at idle for 15 seconds**. Both pilots' lack of situational awareness is further indicated by the failure to initiate a wind shear recovery go around (with Autothrottles OFF) rather than a standard go around.
- 5) Finally, upon saying "You have control", Montri attempted to transfer control of the aircraft to Arief. **Arief never acknowledged the transfer**, and no corrective action was attempted to the aircraft's configuration until 4 seconds before impact. In layman's terms: **For those 15 critical seconds, no one was flying the airplane.**
- 6) Add in the following contributory facts (likely incomplete):
 - A. The flight rosters indicate **extreme fatigue**.
 - B. Orient Thai training manuals do not contain wind shear recovery procedures. EDITED 6/13: Orient Thai had NO training manual at all on September 16, 2007.**
 - C. **Fraudulent checkrides** prevent assurance of skills proficiency.

Contributory Causes of the Crash (likely incomplete):

- **Failure of crew coordination**
- **Failure to follow standard procedures**
- **Failure of the Captain to maintain control of his cockpit**
- **Failure to recognize indications of wind shear**
- **Failure of both pilots to maintain situational awareness**
- **Failure of company to provide proper training**
- **Fatigue**
- **Failure of the company to comply and adhere to regulatory standards**