

The Rescue and Fire Fighting:

According to a paramedic who was part of the rescue effort for OG269

On the positive side:

- The rescuers treated the victims with respect and dignity. It was a good recovery, in that way.
- There was a survivor from the very front of the aircraft. A Thai stewardess was found near the pilots. She was very seriously injured, but has survived. (Not from the paramedic, there was a survivor from seat 6A also. He managed to evacuate himself from the aircraft. Everyone else for many rows back died.)

However, there were the following serious mistakes:

- There had been a training exercise at the Phuket airport a few days before the crash. Apparently this significantly hampered the actual rescue effort because the water and foam supplies hadn't been restocked.
- There was no effective on-site fire fighting capabilities at the Phuket airport. It was staffed with 1 or 2 people at the time of the crash. Therefore, the rescue crew had to come from town. Therefore, it took at least 20 minutes for anyone to get there. (Thus every survivor except for the stewardess, above, was rescued by the passengers or rescued themselves.)
- The call for rescue came across as an airplane that "slid off" the runway, therefore the rescue wasn't initiated with appropriate seriousness. Specifically, the rescue crews didn't necessarily rush over. They showered and took their time arriving, expecting to be pushing an aircraft back onto the ramp.

The paramedic says, "NOT A PROFESSIONAL response in any manner"

Bonnie's Synopsis

Based on [ICAO: International Standards and Recommended Practices Volume I Aerodrome Design and Operations](#))

The ICAO Standard: An airport must meet a Rescue and Fire Fighting standard based on the fuselage size of the aircraft. Based on the size of the MD-82, HKT is Category 7 minimum.

The ICAO standards of Fire and Rescue violated in this Rescue (likely incomplete):

1) Insufficient foam and water due to training exercises 3 days before.

ICAO: Significant changes in the level of protection normally available at an aerodrome for rescue and fire fighting shall be notified to the appropriate air traffic services units and aeronautical information units to enable those units to provide the necessary information to arriving and departing aircraft. When such a change has been corrected, the above units shall be advised accordingly.

2) Massively insufficient firefighting personnel at the on-site fire station, necessitated crew and equipment arrive from town. Their arrival was 20 minutes after the crash - based on a best-case estimate.

ICAO: The operational objective of the rescue and fire fighting service shall be to achieve a response time not exceeding 3 minutes ... The ICAO standard for a category 7 airport is 2 fire and rescue vehicle. I do not believe the on-site fire station was staffed to man those vehicles.

ICAO: Any other vehicles required to deliver the amounts of extinguishing agents (specified in a chart) should arrive no more than one minute after the first responding vehicle(s) so as to provide continuous agent application.

3) Rescue call was identified as a non-emergency

ICAO: ICAO doesn't seem to address the necessity to faithfully report the need for rescue.